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SUABILITY OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IN
INDIANA
KENNETH SHOCKLEY*
The ability to sue an unincorporated association qua
association has, for the last century or more, been a more
or less vexing problem in the courts of this country. The
common law rule that an unincorporated association could
not exist as a legal entity has been adopted by most courts
in the absence of statute.1 Nevertheless, the courts have
consistently avoided the rule where its application would
produce unfair and unjust results. 2 Equity in order to miti-
gate the harshness of the common law rule, permitted class
or representative suits.3
An unincorporated association usually is a body of per-
sons acting together, without a charter, but in the manner
of incorporated bodies, for the prosecution of some common
enterprise. 4 Although, neither a partnership nor a corpora-
tion, the unincorporated association partakes somewhat of
the nature of both. In its organization the unincorporated
association resembles a partnership in that it is a voluntary
association of individuals organized without a charter for
* Of the Kokomo Bar.
Grand Int'l Bro. Loco. Eng. v. Green, 206 Ala. 196, 89 So. 435 (1912);
Karges Furniture Co. v. Almagamated Woodworkers' Local Union
No. 131, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877 (1905); Hanley v. Elm Grove
Mutual Tel. Co., 160 Iowa 198, 192 N. W. 807 (1911); Sturges,
Unworporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1923) 35 Yale
L. J. 383.
2Taff Vale R. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C.
426, 1 B. R. C. 832; United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 27 A. L. R. 762 (1922). Many decisions
declare that the rule is one of form rather than substance. If it
is not taken as a matter of abatement it is waived. Beatty &
Richie v. Kurtz, 2 Peters 566 (U. S. 1829); Iron Moulders' Union
No. 125 v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908);
Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176 (1906); Barnes
& Co. v. Chicago Typo Union, 232 Ill. 402, 83 N. E. 932 (1908).
Contra: Proprietors of the Mex. Mill v. Yellow Jacket Mining
Co., 4 Nev. 40 (1868).
3In equity, regardliss of statutes permitting representative actions,
a suit may be brought against an association having a large mem--
bership by serving as defendants a few natural persons, sufficent
to represent and protect the interests of the entire membership.
Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Union, 90 Fed.
598 (C. C. Ohio, 1898); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S.
662 (1915); Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 392 (1896).
d Hecht v. M alley, 265 U. S. 144, 157 (1923).
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a common enterprise and without authority to issue stock,
Likewise the right of membership is not transferrable by
the individual member, except with the consent of the associ-
ation.5 In its operation, the unincorporated association more
closely resembles a legal corporation in that it usually op-
erates through a board of trustees or a group of officers
who are elected by a vote of the members. These officers,
as a general rule, have complete control and can exercise
their discretionary power, within the limitations of the by-
laws of the association, without any interference from the
members between the stated meetings of the association.
It is this mode of operation that gives rise to the question
so often before the courts of whether the association is not
a legal entity that can sue and be sued through these trus-
tees or officers the same as a corporation may be brought
into court by service upon such officers as have been desig-
nated to receive service of summons.
Although there is still great diversity of opinion, the
trend in most courts is to treat the unincorporated associa-
tion as an entity for the purpose of suing or being sued, and
to permit it to come in or be brought into court by service
upon its officers. Statutes have directed this result in order
to redress wrongs for which recovery otherwise would be
impossible., In determining whether an association is an
entity, a court of the forum will look to the state which
created it, and where statutes are involved, the courts must
look to the legislative intent to determine whether or not
an association constitutes a legal entity.7 In Indiana, the
question has not been ruled on frequently, for unless the
issue was directly presented the court has refrained from
expressing an opinion. Originally the decisions adhered
strictly to the common law rule; but gradually the rule has
been abandoned and reliance has been placed entirely upon
the statutes. In the earliest recorded case, Vattier, Assignee,
v. Roberts,8 an action was brought on promissory notes, pay-
able to an agent of the Aurora Association for internal im-
provements, given in payment of the purchase price of real
property belonging to the association, and the conveyance
5Branagan v. Buckman, 67 Misc. 242, 122 N. Y. Supp. 610 (Sup. Ct.
1910).
6See Warren, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION.
7 Hall v. Essner, 208 Ind. 99, 193 N. E. 86 (1934).
82 Blackf. 255 (Ind. 1829).
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was signed by the agent, as agent for the association. The
defense was that the agent had no authority to make such
a conveyance. The court, in sustaining this defense, said:
"The compafiy was not a corporation, and the members could
not bind themselves by the special denomination of 'The Aurora
Association,' to execute a conveyance; a fortiori, an agent
could not so bind them. The obligation, to have been valid
against the association, should have been executed by all the
individual members, either personally or by their agent."
By this decision, the court refused to recognize the existence
of an unincorporated association as a legal entity, capable
of making a conveyance in its associate name, and regarded
it instead as merely a group of individuals. This position
was re-affirmed in Hays v. Lanier9 In an action by Stapp,
Lanier and Company on a promissory note payable to the
firm, suit was brought in the firm name without any declara-
tion as to who the members of the firm were. The court said:
"There is no principle more certainly and satisfactorily set-
tled than that in all actios the writ and declaration must
both set forth, accurately, the christian and surname of each
plaintiff and each defendant, unless the party is a corpora-
tion, known to the law by an artificial name, and is auth-
orized to sue and be sued in such corporate name. This rule
of law and practice is sustained by reason, justice, and the
highest authorities. In the case now before us, the defendant
in error was not a corporation known to the law by the arti-
ficial name of Stapp, Lanier and Company; they are natural
persons, and must sue in their individual names."
These decisions adhered closely to the common law rule,
and, by implication, denied the power to bring an unincorp-
orated association into court by service on its officers, and
directly required that in such suits all members be named
as individual defendants. For over forty years, this rule
remained the law in Indiana.10
In 1881, the Legislature passed a statute1 which pro-
vided that where there is a common interest or where the
parties are so niumerous as to make it impractical to get
them all in court, then one or more may sue or defend -for
0 3 Blackf. 321 (Ind. 1833).
10 Hughes v. Walker, Carter & Co., 4 Blackf. 50 (Ind. 1835); Barrack-
man v. J. M. Worthington & Co., 5 Blackf. 213 (Ind. 1839); Liv-
ingston v. Harvey, 10 Ind. 218 (1858); The Adams Express Co.
v. Hill, 43 Ind. 157 (1873); Pollock v. Dunning, 54 Ind. 115 (1876).
11 BURNS IND. STAT. (1933) § 2-220.
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the benefit of all. But the courts seemingly did not con-
sider this statute in their subsequent decisions, for as late
as 1905 in the case of Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
Iron Workers Union,12 the court said:
"On the other hand, in the absence of an enabling statute de-
fining the rights and liabilities of the members, societies,
associations, partnerships, and other bodies, combined under
their own rule, for their own private benefit, and without
any express sanction of law, are not, in the collective capacity
and name, recognized from their members; hence no power
to sue or be sued in the company name. Such unincorporated
associations, so far as their rights and liabilities are con-
cerned, are rated as partnerships, and to enforce a right either
for or against them, as in partnerships, the names of all
of the individual members must be set forth, either as plain-
tiffs or defendants."
This decision seems to change the status of members
from that of individuals with a common interest to that
of partners, and thus the association was not recognized
as an entity and the names of all of the members must be
set forth in the proceedings. This rule was followed in
Farmers' Mutual v. Reser, Executrix.13 However, in that
case the court held that since the articles of association
provided for an executive committee who could sue or
defend on behalf of the association, this was sufficient to
take the case out of the general rule and permit a suit by
or against the committee. The court indicated that the
common law rule would be followed unless the articles of
association authorized representative actions. In that case,
if the articles were not contrary to public policy, the court
would recognize and enforce the provisions in order to ex-
pedite the suit.
Not until Colt v. Hicks14 did the court recognize that
the statute of 1881 applied to suits against unincorporated
associations. In that case the surviving widow and bene-
ficiary of a member of the International Union of Steam
Operating Engineers sued members and representatives of
that union for death benefits. The complaint alleged that
there were thousands of members of the association resid-
ing in every state in the United States and in foreign coun-
32 165 Ind. 421 (1905).
1343 Ind. App. 634 (1908).
14 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (1933).
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tries, and that it would be impracticable and impossible to
join all of them as parties defendant, and that the appel-
lants were made defendants to represent and act for all
members of the association. Demurrers by the defendants
for lack of jurisdiction and for defect of parties were over-
ruled by the trial judge, and upon appeal the Indiana Ap-
pellate Court held that the appearance by the defendants
was sufficient for jurisdiction, and the failure to point out
specific parties such as local unions, local joint executive
boards, and state and national officers as proper parties,
was fatal to the demurrer. The court, holding that the
suit came under the statute, said:
"At common law an unincorporated association cannot be
sued in its society or company name, but it is necessary
that all members be made parties to the action, since such
bodies in the absence of statutes, have no legal entity dis-
tinct from that of their members. . . . Equity recognizing
the fact that in many instances this rule was harsh and
would defeat the enforcement of legal and equitable rights,
adopted the equitable doctrine of parties by representation,
and, in the enactment of our Code, the Legislature evidently
intended to and did incorporate in it that equitable doctrine.
This section of the code is a reenactment of a rule which has
prevailed in equity and is to receive a construction which
will make it identical with the pre-existing doctrine."
In its decision the court quotes with approval the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Taft in United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co.,'r as follows:
".. . equitable procedure adapting itself to modern needs
has grown to recognize the need of representation by one
person of many, too numerous to sue or to be sued (citing
authorities); and this has had its influence upon the law
side of litigation, so that out of the very necessities of the
exsting conditions and the utter impossibility of doing justice
otherwise, the suable character of such an organization as
this has come to be recogmzed in some jurisdictions, and
many suits for and against labor unions are reported, in which
no question has been raised as to the right to treat them in
their closely united action and functions as artificial persons
capable of suing or being sued."
The court then went on to say that to require persons to
sue every member would be in effect to leave them remedi-
less.
i 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
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In Indiana this rule has superseded the earlier common
law doctrine. Thus, in Slusser v. Romine16 in an action by
the appellee against the appellants as members of and as
representing the members of the Order of Owls, an unin-
corporated voluntary association, the court cited the de-
cision in Hicks v. Colt and held that under the rule as laid
down in that case the appellee could recover. Later in Mun-
cie Building Trades Council v. Umbarger,17 the court again
followed the statute and held that individual members be-
ing too numerous to name and serve, service on a repre-
sentative group was sufficient to bring the unincorporated
association into court, and a decision rendered against it
was binding on all of its members.
Unincorporated associations may hold property and
make conveyances, with limitation in this state. Generally,
in the absence of a statute, an unincorporated association,
having no legal existence independent of the members who
compose it, is incapable, as an organization, of taking or
holding either real or personal property in its associate
name, and a conveyance to an unincorporated association
passes title to no one.18 In Popovitch v. Yugoslav National
Home Society, Inc.,'9 the court was faced with a case aris-
ing from the sale by the Serbian Beneficial Society of real
estate to the Yugoslav National Home Society, Inc. A ma-
jority of the members of the former organization in a
regular meeting voted to sell the property and the convey-
ance was signed by a majority of the members and their
wives. The action was brought by a dissenting member to
have the deed set aside. The court held that although a
majority vote of the association "is controlling as to in-
ternal questions relative to the government of such society,
... a majority vote of its members could lawfully decide on
the transfer of its property. However, to effectuate a valid
transfer of the legal title to the transferee, it would neces-
sitate the execution of a deed of conveyance by a grantor
having a legal existence or by a grantor who is recognized
by law as having authority to execute a deed of convey-
16 102 Ind. App. 24, 200 N. E. 731 (1935).
17 215 Ind. 13, 17 N. E. (2d) 828 (1938).
18 Harriman v. Southern, 16 Ind. 190 (1861); Miller Lumber Co. v.
Oliver, 65 Mo. App. 435 (1896); Douthitt v. Stimson, 63 Mo. 286
(1876). But see Sturges, supra note 1, at 391.
19 106 Ind. App. 195, 18 N. E. (2d) 948 (1938).
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ance." 20  As the association did not follow the manner set
forth by the statute for the transfer of its property,21 neither
the Society "nor the members who signed the deed had any
authority in law to make a valid conveyance of the real
estate in question."22
Several recent cases have been decided where the un-
incorporated association has been made a party litigant
without any mention or comment on the fact by the court.23
Thus it appears that an unincorporated association may sue
or be sued in its associate character as a matter of course
in Indiana. This result is reached on the authority of
statutes which reenacted the equitable doctrine of suits by
representation, and which expressly permits associations to
hold and convey real estate within limitation, rather than
upon any recognition of the association as a legal entity,
entitled to own property and sue or be sued in its own right,
by the filing of complaint by or the service of summons on
its officers.
Most states have been slow to abandon the common
law rule or even to relax farther than the statutes require.
The decisions, however, represent a wide divergence of
opinions. For example, in Craig v. San Fernando Furniture
Co.2
- the court said:
"Where a group of people are conducting a business under a
common name, the law recognizes that group in its entity
as a legal entity, and whether the group of persons sees fit
to avail themselves of the provisions of the law and form a
corporation, or whether they see fit to conduct that business
under a common name without incorporating, the legal entity
still exists and is designated by the common -name adopted
or used."
On the contrary in New York, the court in Bower v. crim-
mins2 5 took the view that:
"If it was a corporation, an assignment properly drawn and
executed in its own name by the president, and bearing the
seal of the corporation, would be presumptively authorized.
2DPopovich v. Yugoslav Nat. Home Soc., 106 Ind. App. 195, 203, 18
N. E. (2d) 948, 952 (1939).
21BURNS IND STAT. (1933) § 25-1515.
22 Supra nofe 20, at 204.
23 Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union, 24 N. E. (2d)
280 (Ind. 1939); Local Union No. 26, Nat. Bros. of Operative
Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (1937).
24 89 Calif. App. 167, 264 Pac. 784 (1928).
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No such presumption arises in the case of an unincorporated
association, nor is such an association presumed to have a
seal. Such an association is not regarded as a legal entity,
and it necessarily follows that the club or association, as
such, eannot appoint or have an agent. The members may
appoint an agent; but in such a case he is the agent of the
members as individuals. They are joint principals. Such an
association is not a partnership, and to render a member
liable as a principal on contracts made by the persons or
committees who manage and assume to act for the association,
it must be shown that they are expressly or impliedly auth-
orized to represent and bind him."
The object for which the association was formed seems
all important in determining whether the association will
be treated as a legal entity. Courts favor unincorporated
associations which are not engaged in business enterprises,
objects of which do not contemplate profit and loss, but
which are organized for moral, social, benevolent, literary,
scientific, political, or other like purposes, or for the pur-
pose of recreation or amusement. It is generally held that
such associations are not partnerships, and that the mem-
bers are not partners, either as between the members and
third persons dealing with them or the association. Thus,
a Workman's Union, the objects of which are the eleva-
tion of the craft and the raising of the standards of skill
and wages for the members thereof has been held not to
be a partnership.26 Where, however, the association is or-
ganized for commercial purposes, and operated for pecun-
iary profit, it is usually treated as a partnership, and the
rights and liabilities incident to that relationship attach to
its members.2T
The foregoing discussion indicates, however, that as
a general rule and in the absence of applicable statutes to
the contrary, an association is not a legal entity separate
from the persons who compose it; but where statutes per-
mit suits by representation and the holding of property in
the common name, the rigor of the common law rule will be
avoided without recognizing the association as a legal entity.
25 121 N. Y. Supp. 648, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
26 Rhode v. United States, 34 App. D. C. 249; St. Paul Typothetae v.
Bookbinders' Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725 (1905).
27 Chastain v. Baxter, 139 Kan. 381, 31 P. (2d) 21 (1934); Burks v.
Weast, 67 Calif. App. 745, 228 Pac. 541 (1924).
